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Abstract
This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require
the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal pol-
icy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period
model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, find-
ing that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent
targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot
serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ im-
plementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design)
with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare
criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss
function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words,
optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E42, E52, E58
We presented an earlier version at Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. This paper
includes similar literature review and analysis of inconsistency s source to those
of Yuan, Miller, and Chen (2006), which presents another method for the making
of optimal and consistent policy.
1. Introduction 
The economic literature contains a strand that focuses on the optimality and consistency of 
decision making. Optimal plans lead inextricably to inconsistencies. An important part of this 
literature examines the optimality and consistency of microeconomic policy, 1  especially 
monetary policy. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) launch this whole literature by arguing that optimal policy 
proves inconsistent and showing that the inconsistency results from rational expectations. In a 
simple model of monetary policy making, the central bank needs some commitment technique to 
achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Absent the commitment technique, optimal 
monetary policy proves time inconsistent. The Kydland and Prescott (1977) thesis focuses on 
intertemporal issues and the need for commitment. While most of their analysis considers an 
intertemporal model, they do explore the issues within a simple sequential decision, one-period 
model. 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) build an analytical model for analyzing the inconsistency issue 
of monetary policy, by modifying a verbal and graphical model in Kydland and Prescott (1977).2 
Because of rational expectations, an inflation bias prevails under discretion (consistent policy), 
even though the optimal policy equals zero inflation. Barro and Gordon (1983b) prove that 
reputation can provide the commitment technique necessary to make consistent policy, optimal, 
under certain conditions.  
Based on the Barro and Gordon (1983a) standard monetary model, much of the literature 
                                                 
1 Since the macroeconomic model involves the firm’s and wage setter’s decisions, we refer to the macroeconomic 
model as the microeconomic model throughout the paper. 
2 Barro and Gordon (1983a) modify the social objective function, making both the deviations of inflation and 
unemployment from target quadratic terms, whereas the implied model in Kydland and Prescott (1977) enters the 
deviation of unemployment from target as a linear, and not quadratic, term. But, the model in Barro and Gordon 
(1983a) encompasses the verbal and graphical monetary model in Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
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provides solutions to the inconsistency problem in monetary policy. Before considering our 
solution, we first review and define the concepts of optimal and consistent policies. Then, we 
compute optimal policy and consistent policy in a simple model, using control-theory and game-
theory solution techniques. By analyzing consistent policy and its outcome, we find that the 
source of inconsistency comes from the social loss function, whose two targets, the inflation rate 
and the employment level, prove inconsistent. Reconsidering the role of the social loss function, 
we argue that the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. 
Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function 
(mechanism design), while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, 
with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and 
consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable 
(consistent).  
More specifically, implementation theory considers how to design institutions 
(mechanism design) to achieve a socially desirable outcome, given that participants in that 
society interact with each other and may send false signals.3 In other words, implementation 
theory studies how individuals interact within a designed institutional structure to produce the 
outcomes that achieve the social optimum.  
Game theory provides the standard framework for examining issues of implementation 
theory. Usually, game theory problems examine how players respond within a given game 
structure. Implementation theory asks a broader question of how to design the game structure to 
achieve socially optimal outcomes. 
In our context, the central bank’s loss function captures the central bank mechanism. That 
is, we design the central bank’s loss function so that the equilibrium outcome (i.e., consistent 
                                                 
3 Jackson (2001) provides a “crash course” on the theory of implementation. 
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outcome)4 resulting from the game between the central bank and the microeconomy, proves 
optimal, according to the given social welfare criterion. In our context, the social welfare 
criterion equals the minimization of the social loss function. 
Our paper demonstrates, using implementation theory, that appointing a central bank with 
the correct (optimal) objective function or delegating to the central bank that correct (optimal) 
objective function will cause a convergence of the consistent to the optimal monetary policy. 
That is, the correct (optimal) objective function equals the mechanism design that achieves the 
optimal policy. We apply our method to several different variants of the simple sequential 
decision, one-period Barro and Gordon (1983a) model with identical results. The results, using 
the designed central bank’s loss functions, prove identical with the findings in Yuan, Miller, and 
Chen (2006). 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the inconsistency of 
optimal plans. Section 3 develops the simple Barro and Gordon (1983a) type model and 
illustrates how consistent policy proves non-optimal. Section 4 discusses the design of the central 
bank loss function with implementation theory and demonstrates that central bank mechanism 
design achieves optimal and consistent policy. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Optimal Policy and Consistent Policy: A Review 
Strotz (1955-56) first identified the inconsistency of optimal plans. Afterwards, much literature 
illustrates its existence, attempts to determine its sources or causes, and offers its solutions. To 
review this literature, we first clarify the concepts of optimal and consistent plans, making it 
easier to understand the inconsistency of optimal plans. 
 
                                                 
4 See section 2 for more details. 
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Definitions of Optimal and Consistent policy 
For optimal plans, the existing literature employs the same implicit definition, but uses different 
terms, for example, “commitment optimum path” (Pollak, 1968) and “Ramsey policy” (Chari, 
1988). An optimal plan, defined by Strotz (1955-56), implies that an individual chooses over 
some future period of time to maximize the utility of the plan, evaluated in the present. The 
individual’s choice, of course, satisfies certain constraints. Strotz’s definition applies to one-
person decision problems. In a game-theory model, especially a microeconomic model with a 
social planner (e.g., the government or the central bank), we define the optimal policy as the 
social planner’s ex ante plan that, if implemented, produces a Pareto efficient outcome, 
according to some social welfare criterion. 
Now, consider a consistent plan. Strotz (1955-1956) defines a consistent plan as the best 
plan among those that an individual will actually follow. Pollak (1968) argues, however, that 
Strotz’s consistent plan, which corresponds to Pollak’s “naïve optimum path”, could not actually 
occur. Pollak uses another term, “sophisticated optimum path,” for the correct definition of a 
consistent plan. The sophisticated optimum path captures the same idea as subgame perfect 
equilibrium and/or sequential equilibrium in game-theory models, though Pollak’s model 
encompasses only a one-person decision problem. Kydland and Prescott (1977) define consistent 
policy much like Pollak’s “naïve optimum path.” Kydland (1977) suggests that “operational 
characteristics of economics models … point strongly toward an equilibrium concept for 
dynamic dominant-player models … This solution is called the feedback solution … it has the 
property that the original plan is consistent under replanning.” Chari and Kehoe (1989) define 
time consistent policy as a sustainable plan. Sustainability closely relates to subgame perfection 
and sequential equilibrium. In sum, in microeconomic models with more than one decision 
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maker, we define a consistent policy as the government’s (or the central bank’s) plan, which, 
together with the strategies of other decision makers, constitutes an equilibrium. The equilibrium 
can include a Nash equilibrium, a subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), or a sequential 
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). At this point, we do not discuss, in detail, which 
equilibrium concept proves more appropriate, because different equilibrium concepts correspond 
to different types of game-theory models. Also, the concept of equilibrium continuously evolves. 
Loosely speaking, an equilibrium contains a strategy profile that results in “an outcome that 
satisfies mutually consistent expectations.” (Shubik, 1998, p. 6) 
Existence and Sources of Inconsistency 
With clear definitions of optimal and consistent plans, we can now more easily grasp the nature 
of the inconsistency of optimal plans from the perspective of game theory, where equilibria often 
prove Pareto inefficient. Now, given that optimal plans generally prove inconsistent, the 
literature studies the sources of inconsistency. For one-person decision problems, inconsistency 
may arise from an “intertemporal tussle” (Strotz, 1955-1956) and the specific form of the utility 
function.5 Thus, for example, Calvo (1978a), Rodriguez (1981), and Leininger (1985) show that 
consistent and optimal plans exist in an important class of economies with special forms for the 
utility function (e.g., stationary period or instantaneous utility). Other researchers, such as 
Dasgupta (1974), demonstrate that an inadequate social welfare criterion can lead to inconsistent 
optimal plans. In sum, inconsistency can occur for different specific reasons in different specific 
models. This view, we argue also applies to more-than-one-person decision problems (i.e., game-
theory models).  
                                                 
5 Actually, the “intertemporal tussle” in Strotz (1955-1956) results from the non-exponential discount function, 
which also captures a specific functional form of utility. 
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Kydland and Prescott (1977)  first identify the inconsistency that resulted from rational 
expectations.6 Rational expectations imply the important notion of equilibrium in game theory. 
As defined above, an equilibrium outcome reflects rational players’ mutually consistent 
expectations. We argue that they correctly recognize the source of inconsistency of the optimal 
plan. Then Kydland and Prescott (1977) conclude “there is no way control theory can be made 
applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.” (p. 473) But in Kydland and 
Prescott (1980), they also indicate, “Even though there is little hope of the optimal plan being 
implemented—because of its time inconsistency—we think the exercise is of more than 
pedagogical interest. The optimal plan’s return is a benchmark with which to compare the time 
consistent solution...” (p. 79) In other words, control theory can identify the optimal plan and, 
thus, the optimal economic outcomes. Then, we can seek a consistent plan that coincides with the 
optimal plan through institutional design. That is, the optimal plan can indicate how to design the 
optimal institution, through which we implement the optimal plan with a consistent plan. This 
task encompasses the rest of this paper and the other paper by Yuan, Miller, and Chen (2006). 
Solutions to Inconsistency of Optimal Plan 
We classify the solutions to the inconsistency of optimal plans into three types: rules, reputation, 
and delegation. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue for “rules rather than discretion.” That is, rules can 
provide the commitment technique to achieve optimal policy. And the literature provides many 
illustrations that economies perform better under rules than under consistent policy (i.e., 
discretion). As a result, a literature exists on the design of policy rules. In monetary models, they 
include McCallum (1988), Taylor (1993), Svensson (1999), and so on.  
                                                 
6 Calvo (1978b) independently identifies this point. 
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As we know, equilibria often exhibit Pareto inefficiency (i.e., consistent policy generally 
proves not optimal). Game theory suggests, however, that an equilibrium outcome may prove 
optimal under certain conditions, if the game repeats and reputation plays a role. Barro and 
Gordon (1983b) construct such a model to show that optimal policy proves implementable and 
consistent under certain conditions. Backus and Driffill (1985) demonstrate that reputation, based 
on the concept of Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequential equilibrium, makes optimal policy 
credible. We, however, do not advocate the reputation approach, which we explain below. 
In our context and in monetary models, delegation means that the government delegates a 
monetary policy objective to the central bank. In a broad sense, delegation implies mechanism or 
institutional design. When establishing a specific institution (e.g., the central bank), the 
government must delegate an appropriate objective. For example, Rogoff (1985), Walsh (1995), 
Svensson (1997), and Chortareas and Miller (2003) fall broadly into the delegation approach. 
Rogoff (1985) argues for the appointment of a “conservative” central banker. That is, 
appoint a central banker who places a higher weight on reducing inflation than society. We note 
for later reference that this approach implies that the central banker uses a loss function that 
differs from society. Rogoff’s conservative central banker cannot completely eliminate the 
inflation bias, which prevails under consistent policy. That is, consistent policy still does not 
prove optimal under Rogoff’s conservative central banker. 
Svensson (1997) delegates an inflation target that differs from society’s target. Once 
again, the central banker possesses a loss function that differs from the social loss function. 
Svensson’s inflation target can completely eliminate the inflation bias, if we simplify Svensson’s 
model to the basic model without employment persistence. That is, consistent policy proves 
optimal under inflation targeting for the simplified model.  
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Walsh (1995) introduces an incentive contract that penalizes the central banker for 
deviations from the target inflation rate. The proper choice of the penalization rate completely 
eliminates the inflation bias. Walsh implicitly assumes that the government places no weight on 
the cost of the incentive contract. Chortareas and Miller (2003) show that if the government 
places some weight on the cost of the incentive contract that the contract cannot completely 
eliminate the inflationary bias. As an alternative to the inflation contract, Chortareas and Miller 
(2003) propose an output contract for the central banker that penalizes deviations of output from 
the natural level. The proper choice of the penalty rate completely eliminates the inflation bias, 
even if the government cares about the cost of the contract. 
In sum, delegation solutions to the inconsistency problem adopt a central bank loss 
function that differs from society’s loss function. Using implementation theory, we develop a 
general method of mechanism design or delegation of a correct (optimal) central bank loss 
function so that the optimal policy proves implementable (i.e. consistent). 
3. Optimal and Consistent Policy in a Simple Model  
Barro and Gordon (1983a) introduce a basic model for analyzing the inconsistency issue in 
monetary policy. We adopt a one-period model with complete information. Reasons follow.  
First, understanding our analytical method becomes less difficult in the simplest models. 
Thus, we attack the problem one piece at a time.  
Second, for a one-period game, the inconsistency of optimal plans generally exists, no 
matter whether players’ decisions occur simultaneously or sequentially.7 The prisoner’s dilemma 
provides an example of the simultaneous-decision, one-period game model. Before the game 
begins, both suspects know that their optimal strategy equals “confess,” their rational and 
                                                 
7 Kydland (1977, p313) notes that even in the first period, the dominant player may deviate from the original policy, 
implying inconsistency even in the one-period game. He refers to the deviant policy as the closed-loop policy. A 
similar deviation occurs for open-loop policy—the optimal policy. 
 9
consistent strategy equals “defect,” once the game starts. Other examples of sequential-decision, 
one-period games exist, where such inconsistency prevails.  
Third, some multi-period models in the literature basically reduce to one-period models 
for a stationary period function and a discount function δ t, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 equals the discount 
factor. Such models include the inflation-unemployment example in Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) and the Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) model.  
Fourth, a repeated game creates other difficulties, making them much different from the 
one-period game. The Folk Theorem indicates that equilibrium outcomes of the game only 
require that each player’s payoff exceeds the player’s max-min payoff. No definite method 
predicts which equilibrium gets chosen, however. Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes in a 
repeated game may depend on psychology and culture. As a result, the equilibrium becomes 
unreliable.8 But, if we make optimal policy consistent in a one-period game, then in the repeated 
game, the equilibrium (consistent) policy always proves optimal.  
Finally, we can consider a repeated game with incomplete information as a one-period 
game with complete information. As the game repeats, players adjust their beliefs in a Bayesian 
fashion and approach complete information as the game progresses. 
The Basic Model 
We begin with a standard-version model of the microeconomy and a quadratic social loss 
function in terms of the inflation rate and employment.9 That is, 
(1)  ( ) ( )220L p pχ= − + −? ? , 
                                                 
8 But Barro and Gordon (1983b) show that reputation plays a role and indicate the conditions under which the 
consistent policy proves optimal. 
9 See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983a), Rogoff (1985), Flood and Isard (1989), Lohnman (1992), Walsh 
(1995), Persson and Tabellini (1993), Svensson (1997), and so on. 
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where p equals the natural logarithm of the price level, p0 equals its initial value, ℓ equals the 
natural logarithm of the employment level, and ?  equals the natural logarithm of “full 
employment,” which we assume higher than the natural logarithm of the natural level of 
employment, ?~ . The social loss function implies that the society considers two targets – a zero 
inflation rate10 and “full employment.” The weight that society places on the inflation target 
relative to the employment target equals χ, the trade-off parameter. To simplify, we consider 
only a one-period social loss function, allowing us to omit the time period subscript t. We also 
assume that the central bank directly controls the price level, p. 
Now, we model the microeconomic structure with an expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve and rational expectations. That is, 
(2)  upw −−−= )(~ β??  and 
(3)  , or ( )pEw = ( ) ( )[ ]2min pwELE WSw −= , 
where β equals the responsiveness of employment to unexpected inflation, w equals the natural 
logarithm of the wage setter’s nominal wage rate, u equals an independently and identically 
distributed negative supply shock with mean 0 and variance σ 2, LWS equals the wage setter’s loss 
function, and E equals the mathematical expectation operator. 
The private sector’s behavioral equations (2) and (3), the firm (F) and the wage setter 
(WS), respectively, incorporate the following logic. The wage setter and the firm sign a wage 
contract, where the wage setter sets the nominal wage, w, and the firm sets the amount of labor, ℓ, 
that it hires. After signing the wage contract, a negative shock, u, may occur. Then, the central 
bank (CB) implements its policy decision, p. Since the contract fixes the nominal wage, the wage 
                                                 
10  Equation (1) proves equivalent to the other typical specification, where 2 ( )L χπ= + −? ? 2 , because 
( )0 0 lnP P P d P dp p pπ = − = = = − 0 , where P and P0 equal the price level and its initial value. 
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setter must form a rational expectation of the price level before setting the wage rate [i.e., the 
wage setter uses behavioral equation (3)]. Finally, given the firm’s decision, a certain 
employment level emerges from the firm’s behavioral equation (2). The timing of the sequential 
decisions in this one-period model unfolds according to the following chart: 
 w u p ( )w p uβ= − − −?? ?CB   F Shock WS  
 
 
Further, we assume that the participants in the economy (i.e., central bank, wage setter, 
and firm) view the model as common knowledge (i.e., the social loss function and the two 
private-sector behavioral equations). 
We combine the above assumptions into the following model: 
(4)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−=
−−−=
−+−=
2
22
0
min
)(~
..
min
pwELE
upw
ts
ppL
WSw
p
β
χ
??
??
. 
Now we compute this model’s optimal policy and consistent policy with control-theory 
and game-theory solution techniques. 
Optimal Policy 
As stated above, control theory can provide a useful benchmark. With control theory, we 
determine the optimal plan and, thus, the optimal economic outcome. This provides a benchmark 
for policy making. The benchmark case assumes complete information with decisions made by 
one person before the game starts. That is, we assume that the optimal policy reflects an ex ante 
plan made by a social planner with complete information. The optimal policy and outcomes for 
model (4) reduce to the following results:11
                                                 
11 See Appendix A for the derivation. 
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(5)  0 2p p u
β
χ β= + + , 
(6)  u2
~
βχ
χ
+−= ?? , and 
(7)  ( ) 2 22E L kχ σχ β= ++ . 
Consistent Policy 
To better facilitate comparison with the analysis of Section 4, we rewrite the problem expressed 
in model (4) as a two-player, sequential-decision, one-period game as follows, where the wage 
setter moves first: 
Players The Wage Setter The Central Bank 
Preferences ( ) ( )2WSE L E w p⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ ( )
2_2
0CBL p pχ ⎛ ⎞= − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠? ?  
Strategies w p 
Subject to the Firm’s Decision: ( )w p uβ= − − −?? ?  
Using backward induction to solve the problem expressed in model (4) and in the above 
game form, we first must solve for the central bank’s optimal decision for the price level. That is, 
given the nominal wage and the supply shock, the central bank chooses the p to minimize the 
social loss function, yielding the following relationship: 
(8)  
2
02 2 2 2p p w k
χ β β β
χ β χ β χ β χ β= + + ++ + + + u , 
where k ≡ − ?? ?  equals the employment bias.  
With the central bank’s reaction function in equation (8), the wage setter’s expected loss 
equals the following relationship: 
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(9)  ( ) ( )
2 2
2
02 2WSE L w p k
χ β β
2 σχ β χ β χ β
⎡ ⎤ ⎛= − − + ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ + +⎣ ⎦ ⎝
⎞
⎠ . 
Therefore, the equilibrium nominal wage equals12
(10)  0w p k
β
χ= + . 
Substituting equation (10) into equation (8) yields the equilibrium price level as follows: 
(11)  0 2p p k u
β β
χ χ β= + + + . 
As observed in the standard literature, there exists an inflationary bias, ( )0E p p kβχ− = . 
With the equilibrium nominal wage and price level, we get the equilibrium employment: 
(12)  u2
~
βχ
χ
+−= ?? , 
which generates the expected social loss as follows: 
(13)  ( ) 22 22 1E L kχ βσχ β χ
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
. 
Compared with the optimal policy and outcomes in equations (5), (6) and (7), the 
consistent policy in equation (11) generates the inflationary bias (i.e., a higher price level than 
the initial one) and a larger social loss in equation (13) results from the inflationary bias. 
Two important points deserve comment. First, the two targets in the social loss 
function, 0  and p ? , actually conflict with each other, given the microeconomic structure in 
equations (2) and (3). If the central bank wants to achieve full employment, it must inflate the 
economy, meaning that the central bank cannot achieve the zero inflation-rate target. If the 
                                                 
12 Equation (10) emerges by setting ( ) 0WSdE L dw = . 
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central bank, on the other hand, wants to hit the zero inflation-rate target, then it cannot raise the 
employment level above the natural level. So the two targets, 0 and p ? , prove incompatible. 
Does it make sense to delegate incompatible targets to the central bank? 
Second, we observe that the employment target, ? , proves overambitious and unattainable 
under the assumptions of the microeconomic model because 
(14)  ( ) [ ] [ ]( ) ( )E E w p u w E p E uβ β⎡ ⎤= − − − = − − − =⎣ ⎦? ?? ? ? ?? , 
which means that the level of employment can only equal the natural level, on average. 
According to equations (11) and (12), we also know that 
(15)  
( )
( )
0 0 and E p p k p
E
β
χ= + ≠
= ≠?? ? ?
. 
The above inequalities mean that, on average, the central bank cannot achieve each of its targets, 
which seems illogical. Society should not delegate such targets to the central bank. A more 
sensible approach makes the following assumptions about delegating targets to the central bank 
(16)  ( ) ( )* * and p E p E= =? ? . 
That is, proper targets should allow the central bank to achieve them. The assumptions in equation 
(16) prove essential for pinning down the central bank loss function in Section 4. Actually, the 
assumptions in (16) hold when choosing parameters, , to minimize the central bank loss 
function.
* and p ?*
                                                
13
Reconsidering the role of the social loss function, it provides a social welfare criterion, 
reflecting a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the 
 
13 See equations (29), (31) and (32). 
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microeconomy. Consequently, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for 
the central bank. We will use implementation theory to design a central bank mechanism (i.e. the 
central bank loss function) that interacts with the microeconomy so that the equilibrium outcome 
proves optimal according to the given social welfare criterion.  
4. Central Bank Mechanism Design  
Given the social welfare criterion and the microeconomic structure (i.e., microeconomic 
preferences), we identify the optimal policy and its outcomes (i.e., the social choice function) 
with the solution techniques in control theory. Then we design the loss function of the central 
bank that interacts with microeconomic preferences so that the central bank’s consistent (i.e., 
equilibrium) policy and its equilibrium outcomes coincide with the optimal policy and the 
optimal outcomes. Thus, the optimal policy and its outcomes prove implementable. 
Social Welfare Criterion 
A popular view takes optimizing the representative household’s utility as the social welfare 
criterion. This view, however, does not permit differences between private and social interests.  
Social welfare criteria can also capture the ideas of Rawls’ maximin criterion (Rawls, 1971), the 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (Pollak, 1979), or Arrow’s social welfare function 
(Arrow 1951), and so on. Thus, we argue that constructing the social welfare criterion reflects a 
normative problem in philosophy. In our context, we assume that the social welfare criterion 
minimizes the social loss function given in equation (1). 
Outcomes 
The social loss function incorporates 0, , pχ  and  as parameters and 
_
? p  and  as economic 
outcomes. We define A as the set of economic outcomes: 
?
(17)  ( ){ },   A p p and += ∈? ? ? . 
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Preferences 
We assume that the preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R= , for the microeconomy (i.e., the firm and 
the wage setter, respectively) equals equations (2) and (3). That is, 
(18)  
( ) ( )2
:     ( )
:   min
F
WS WSw
R w p u
R E L E w p
β= − − −
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
?? ?
. 
Here, the preference of the firm appears in its behavioral equation, which comes from the first-
order condition of its profit function with a Cobb-Douglas production function with one variable 
factor of production (i.e., labor). The preference of the wage setter, who intends to hold the real 
wage level constant, equals the expected loss function, ( ) ( )[ ]2pwELE WS −= .  
To illustrate our method for mechanism design, we also assume another microeconomic 
preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R′ ′ ′= , as follows: 
(19)  
( ) ( ) _2 2
:     ( )
:   min 2 ( ) ( )
F
WS WSw
R w p u
R E L E w p w p
β
γ λ
′ = − − −
⎡ ⎤′ = − − + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?? ?
? ?
. 
Now, F FR R′ =  and we modify the wage setter’s preference to include a desire for a higher real 
wage rate as well as higher employment than the natural level. We specify WSR′  to encompass 
WSR  so that we can derive the mechanism, designed for profile ( ),F WSR R R= , as a special case of 
this encompassing profile . Moreover, we can compare the mechanisms under 
these two different preference profiles,
( ,F WSR R R′ ′ ′= )
R  and R′ . 
We denote the set of admissible preference profiles as ℜ .  
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Social Choice Correspondence 
A social choice correspondence, F, maps the preference profiles into subsets of outcomes. That 
is, for any preference profile , R ∈ℜ ( )F R A⊂  represents the set of socially desirable outcomes. 
A single-valued F is referred to as a social choice function. 
In many applications, F will represent a well-known correspondence, such as the 
Walrasian, or top-cycle, correspondence, or will represent a social choice correspondence 
derived from some normative criterion. In our context, the social choice function, F, derives from 
the social welfare criterion (1), using control theory. Specifically, for R and , we define: R′∈ℜ
(20)  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 2 2, ,F R p R R p u u Aβ χχ β χ β⎛ ⎞≡ ≡ + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
?? ?? ? ∈ , and14
(21)  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 2 2 2( ), , (1 )kF R p R R p u u Aβ β γ λβ χχ β λβ χ β⎛ ⎞−′ ′ ′≡ ≡ + − −⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
?? ?? ? ∈ .15
Mechanism Design and Equilibrium Outcomes 
The central bank’s loss function provides a mechanism. Now, we design the central bank’s loss 
function, which takes the following form: 
(22)  ( ) ( )2 2* *CBL p pχ= − + −? ?* , 
where we need to design the three parameters, . * * *, , and pχ ?
Under the preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R= , the sequential-play, one-period game 
between the wage setter and the central bank possesses the following structure: 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Appendix A for the derivation. 
15 See Appendix B for the derivation. 
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Players The Wage Setter The Central Bank 
Preferences ( ) ( )2WSE L E w p⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ ( ) ( )2 2* *CBL p pχ= − + −? ?*  
Strategies w p 
Subject to the Constraint :     ( )FR w p uβ= − − −?? ?  
 
The equilibrium strategy profile chosen equals  
(23)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* * * ** * *ˆ ˆ, ,w R p R p p uβ β βχ χ χ⎛ ⎞≡ + − + − +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠? ?? ? ? ? 2β , 
and the equilibrium outcome equals 
(24)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ** ** * 2 *ˆˆ , , 2p R R p u uβ β χχ χ β χ β⎛ ⎞≡ + − + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠? ?? ? ? ? .16
Similarly, under the preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R′ ′ ′= , the sequential-play, one-period game 
between the wage setter and the central bank possesses the following structure: 
Players The Wage Setter The Central Bank 
Preferences ( ) ( ) _2 22 ( ) ( )WSE L E w p w pγ λ⎡ ⎤= − − + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? ( ) (
2 2* * *
CBL p pχ= − + −? ? )  
Strategies w p 
Subject to the Constraint :     ( )FR w p uβ= − − −?? ?  
 
The equilibrium strategy profile chosen equals  
                                                 
16 The backward solution technique follows that outlined in Section 3 under the Consistent Policy subsection. 
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(25)  ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
* *
* 2 2
* *
* 2
( ) ( ) ,
(1 ) (1 )
ˆ ˆ,
( )
(1 )
k kp
w R p R
k
* 2p u
β β γ λβ γ λβ
χ λβ λβ
β β γ λβ β
χ λβ χ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− −+ − + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟′ ′ ≡ ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤−⎜ ⎟+ − + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ +⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
?? ?
?? ? β
,  
and the equilibrium outcome equals 
(26)  ( ) ( )( ) ( )
* *
* 2 * 2
*
2 * 2
( ) ,
(1 )ˆˆ ,
( )
(1 )
kp u
p R R
k u
β β γ λβ β
χ λβ χ β
β γ λβ χ
λβ χ β
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤−+ − + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟′ ′ ≡ ⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
?? ?
?
??
.17
Implementation 
Implementing the social choice function, F, means that ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆˆ , ,p R R p R R= ??? ? , that is, 
the equilibrium outcome equals the socially desirable outcome, for all R . Under the 
preference profile, , 
∈ℜ
( ),F WSR R R= ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆˆ , ,p R R p R R= ??? ?  means that 
(27)  
( )* * 0* * 2
*
* 2 2
2p u p u
u u
β β
χ χ β χ
χ χ
χ β χ β
⎧ + − + = +⎪ + +⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ − = −+ +⎪⎩
?? ?
? ?? ?
β
β
. 
Therefore,  
(28)  
( )
*
* *
0p p
χ χ
β
χ
⎧ =⎪⎪⎨⎪ + − =⎪⎩
?? ?
.18
An infinite number of combinations of *p  and  exist that conform to equations (28). To 
pin down their values, we use the assumptions in equation (16) and obtain 
*?
                                                 
17 See footnote 16. 
18 This result equals that in Yuan and Miller (2006). 
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(29)  
( )
( )
*
0
*
ˆ
ˆ
p E p p
E
⎧ = =⎪⎪⎨⎪ = =⎪⎩ ?? ? ?
. 
Viewing the problem somewhat differently, but leading to the same conclusion, the 
assumptions in (16) minimize the central bank loss function. To see this, consider the value of the 
central bank loss function, given the solutions to the minimization of the social loss function. 
Note that the only ambiguity relates to the values of the target price and employment levels. That 
is, the first equation in (28) indicates that the weight associated with the inflation term in the 
social loss function equals the weight in the central bank loss function. Thus, we need to choose 
the target price and employment levels to minimize the following central bank loss function: 
(30)  
* *
2 2
~
* *
0 2 2,
~
* 2 * 2 2
0 2
min ,
( ) ( ) .
CBp
EL E p u p u
p p
β χχ χ β χ β
χχ σχ β
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥= + − + − −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫= − + − + ⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭
?
? ?
? ?
⎞⎟⎠
 
This minimization problem produces the following solutions: 
(31)  * 0p p=  and  
(32)  . * = ?? ?
Thus, the assumptions in (16) hold when the central bank’s targets minimize its loss function. As a 
result, the optimal target values in the central bank loss function minimize the central bank loss 
function as well as the social loss function. The central bank’s minimum loss equals the 
following: 
(33)  22 .CBEL
χ σχ β
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭  
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In sum, under the preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R= , the optimal central bank loss function 
equals the following: 
(34)  . ( ) ( )220CBL p pχ= − + − ?? ?
With this designed loss function, the equilibrium outcome equals the optimal outcome: 
(35)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 2 2ˆˆ , , ,p R R p R R p u uβ χχ β χ β⎛ ⎞= ≡ + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
?? ?? ? ? A∈ . 
That is, the optimal policy proves consistent. 
Under the preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R′ ′ ′= , implementing the social choice function 
means that ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )ˆˆ , ,p R R p R R′ ′ ′ ′= ??? ? . That is, 
(36)  
( )* * 0* 2 * 2
*
2 * 2 2 2
( )
(1 )
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
k
2p u p u
k ku u
β β γ λβ β β
χ λβ χ β
β γ λβ χ β γ λβ χ
λβ χ β λβ χ β
⎧ ⎡ ⎤−+ − + + = +⎪ ⎢ ⎥+ + +⎣ ⎦⎪⎪⎨⎪ − −⎪ − − = − −⎪ + + + +⎩
?? ?
? ?? ?
χ β
. 
Therefore,  
(37)  
( ) ( )( )
*
* *
021
k
p p
χ χ
β γ λββ
χ λβ
⎧ =⎪⎪⎨ ⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎢ ⎥+ − + =⎪ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩
?? ?
.19
An infinite number of combinations of *p  and  exist that conform to equations (37). To 
pin down their values, we use the assumptions in equation (16). That is, 
*?
                                                 
19 This result equals that in Yuan, Miller, and Chen (2006). 
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(38)  
( )
( )
*
0
*
2
ˆ
( )ˆ
(1 )
p E p p
kE β γ λβλβ
⎧ = =⎪⎪⎨ −⎪ = = −⎪ +⎩
?? ? ?
.20
In sum, under the preference profile, ( ),F WSR R R′ ′ ′= , the optimal central loss function 
equals the following: 
(39)  ( )
2
2
0 2
( )
(1 )CB
kL p p β γ λβχ λβ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞−= − + − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
?? ? . 
With this designed loss function, the equilibrium outcome equals the optimal outcome: 
(40) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0 2 2 2( )ˆˆ , , , (1 )kp R R p R R p u uβ β γ λβ χχ β λβ χ β⎛ ⎞−′ ′ ′ ′= ≡ + − −⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
?? ?? ? ? A∈
                                                
. 
That is, the optimal policy proves consistent. 
5. Conclusion 
Since the work of Strotz (1955-1956), economists continue to struggle with the consistency of 
optimal plans. Kydland and Prescott (1977) link the problem to the time consistency of optimal 
economic policy, showing that consistent policy proves non-optimal, in a game framework. 
Much work focuses on the simple one-period, game-theory problem developed by Barro and 
Gordon (1983a,b). Within that model, an inflationary bias exists, since consistent policy proves 
non-optimal. 
Our paper develops a general method for making consistent policy optimal. We utilize 
implementation theory and demonstrate that with the correct mechanism design for the central 
bank loss function, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent). That is, appointing a 
central bank with the correct (optimal) objective function or delegating to the central bank that 
 
20 These two target values also minimize the mechanism design central bank loss function. 
 23
correct (optimal) objective function will cause a convergence of the consistent to the optimal 
monetary policy. That is, the correct (optimal) objective function equals the mechanism design 
that achieves the optimal policy. We apply our method to several different variants of the simple 
sequential-decision, one-period Barro and Gordon (1983a) model with identical results. The 
results, using the designed central bank’s loss functions, prove identical with the findings in 
Yuan, Miller, and Chen (2006). 
Control theory plays a role and provides a benchmark for mechanism design. Specifically, 
in our context, the social choice function, F, derives from minimizing the social loss function, 
using control theory. With the social choice function as a criterion, we design the central bank 
loss function. 
Carefully designing the central bank’s loss function can make optimal policy and 
consistent policy identical. This desirable result requires an understanding the two following 
points. First, the determination of the social loss function reflects a normative process. The social 
loss function only provides a criterion for designing a public institution, not the direct loss 
function for this specific institution. Second, the preferences of the microeconomy prove key to 
determining the central bank loss function. That is, an optimal loss function for the central bank 
must depend on the preferences of the microeconomy. 
In sum, the correct central bank loss function depends on two factors -- the social welfare 
criterion and the preferences of the microeconomy. Future research should focus on the 
following. First, consider our method with alternative normative social welfare criteria and with 
alternative microeconomic preferences. Second, and more important, evaluate our method within 
a dynamic model, since economic variables generally prove persistent. 
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Appendix A: 
For the two-stage stochastic optimization problem associated with model (4) and with the 
preference profiles contained in expression (18), the first stage solves for the optimal value of 
deterministic variable, w, under certainty.21 That is, solving the follow model 
(A-1)  
( ) ( )220,min
( ). .
w p
L p p
w ps t
w p
χ
β
= − + −
⎧ = − −⎨ =⎩
? ?
?? ? , 
we find that 
(A-2)  . 
~
0w p p and= = =? ?
The second-stage adjusts the price level, p, after a shock, u, occurs. Because the loss 
function equals a quadratic form with linear constraints, the adjustment of p must include a term 
linear in u. Thus, 
(A-3)  0p p au= + ; and 
the second-stage problem equals the following: 
(A-4)  
( ) ( )
( )
22
0 0
0
0
min
. .
a
EL E p au p
w p au u
s t
w p
χ
β
⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − − + −⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎨ =⎪⎩
? ?
?? ? , 
which generates 2a
β
χ β= + . That is, the optimal policy equals that reported in equations (5) and 
(6) and in equation (20). 
 
                                                 
21 See Kolbin (1977) and Marti (2005) for the two-stage solution technique with a stochastic optimization. In sum, 
the approach solves the optimization under certainty and then incorporates the random shock in the second stage as 
done in Appendix A and B. 
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Appendix B: 
For the two-stage stochastic optimization problem associated with the preference profiles 
contained in expression (19), the first-stage solves for the optimal value of deterministic variable, 
w, under certainty. That is, solving the following model 
(B-1)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
0,
min
( )
. .
0
w p
E L E p p
w p
s t
w p
χ
β
γ λβ
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − −⎪⎨− + − − − =⎪⎩
? ?
?? ?
? ?
, 
with the constraint, ( ) ( ) 0w pγ λβ− + − − − =? ? , coming from the first-order condition of the 
wage-setter’s loss function, we find that 
(B-2)  0 02 2
( ) ( ), ,  and 
(1 ) (1 )
k kw p p pγ λβ β γ λβλβ λβ
− −= + = = −+ +
?? ? . 
The second-stage adjusts the price level, p, after a shock, u, occurs. Similarly, the 
adjustment of p must include a linear term in u as follows:  
(B-3)  0p p bu= + ; and 
now, the second-stage problem equals the following: 
(B-4)  
( ) ( )
( )
22
0 0
0
0 2
min
. . ( )
(1 )
b
EL E p bu p
w p bu u
s t kw p
χ
β
γ λβ
λβ
⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎪⎨ −= +⎪ +⎩
? ?
?? ? , 
which generates 2b
β
χ β= + . That is, the optimal policy equals that reported in equation (21). 
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